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LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Ethical challenges in pregnant women with brain injury
Sir,
Brain death was first defined by Mollaret and Goulon in
1959, and it remains the medically and legally accepted
framework for the diagnosis of death [1,2]. Brain death is
caused by a bilateral hemispheric injury that has second-
arily resulted in loss of all brainstem function, including
breathing and resulting in hypotension requiring vaso-
pressor [3].
Recent improvements in life support technology and
critical care management make it possible to maintain
the patient’s vital functions after the brain death. The
question whether or not to offer support to brain-dead
patient has become a controversial ethical issue, espe-
cially when brain death occurs during pregnancy [2–5].
On 23 November 2013, M.M. a 33-year-old pregnant
women at 14 weeks was found unconscious in her home
in Texas, USA, after a massive pulmonary embolism which
led to a brain death. Her husband requested that life sup-
port measured be discontinued. The hospital declined the
family’s request to “protect the unborn child”. However,
almost 2 months after and following a judge’s order the
life support was removed [4]. Notably, Texas is not
unique in constraining pregnant women’s end-of-life care
and decision making. More than half of USA states have
some such restrictions [4].
In the same year in Dublin, N.P., a 26-year-old preg-
nant woman at 15 weeks, was declared clinically dead on
3 December after suffering brain trauma [2]. Her family
requested that somatic life support be discontinued.
However, because the State of Ireland vindicates the right
to life of the unborn, doctors decided to keep her on life-
support treatment, worrying about the legal implications
of her pregnancy. Currently, she is still on life support.
Hence, the case was appealed to the High Court of
Dublin, which, according to the Act of 26 December 2014
authorizes the interruption of any somatic life support,
albeit leaving open the possibility to resort to a different
option in the event that the fetus were to have a reason-
able chance of survival.
Equally revealing is a third case, which despite dating
back to 1986, is nonetheless worth mentioning for the
purpose of our analysis. That year, in Georgia, USA, D.P., a
26-year-old pregnant woman at 16 weeks, was found
unconscious in the rest room of a mall owing to an over-
dose. In the following weeks, her clinical conditions wors-
ened towards brain death. Four weeks after
hospitalization (20th weeks of pregnancy), whereas her
husband requested that she be taken off life support, her
biological father demanded that her treatment be pro-
longed. In the end, the Superior Court of Richmond
County ruled that she be maintained on life support until
the birth of her child. Unfortunately, the infant, born pre-
maturely, died few hours after birth because of multiple
organ failure [6].
Esmaeilzadeh et al. [2] in a systematic review discussed
the management of brain-dead mothers and gave an
overview of recommendations concerning the organ sup-
porting therapy. They found 30 cases reported between
1982 and 2010; the mean gestational age at brain dead
and mean gestational age at delivery was 22 and
29.5 weeks, respectively. They concluded that the man-
agement of a brain-dead pregnant woman requires a
multidisciplinary team which should follow available
standards, guidelines and recommendations both for a
nontraumatic therapy of the fetus and for an organ-pre-
serving treatment of the potential donor. A nontraumatic
brain injury was the cause of the brain dead in 26 of 30
women. Twelve viable infants were born and survived
the neonatal period [2].
In 2011, a FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of
Hyman Reproduction and Women’s Health, stated six rec-
ommendations for brain death during pregnancy. They
concluded that women have the right to die in dignity
and the goal of fetal rescue does not exonerate health-
care givers from the duty to respect this right of the pri-
mary patient, i.e. the women; questions regarding
maintaining pregnancy must be answered in consultation
with the remaining family and should be decided in light
of fetal viability [5]. The decision about whether attempts
to maintain pregnancy are likely to be successful depends
first on the gestational age of the fetus. For brain death
in early pregnancy, supportive care may lead to the birth
of a desperately premature neonate. However, starting at
12–14 weeks of gestation, fetal survival has been success-
fully prolonged for 15 weeks, bringing the fetus beyond
the threshold of viability [5].
Besides providing a short description of these cases, it
behooves us to make some personal observations regard-
ing each case. From the two recent cases of M.M. and
N.P., it emerges that, in accordance with FIGO’s ethical
recommendations [5], the protection of “prenatal life”
should not, under any circumstances, convey the mislead-
ing idea that a brain-dead pregnant woman is to be
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considered as a mere “artificial container”. Such miscon-
ception would thereby expose the woman to useless
therapeutic obstinacy and to the ensuing complications
associated with the use of ever more invasive life support
techniques. Supposedly, such measures are taken in the
name of the sacredness of the fetus—the concept on
which many antiabortionists rely on to support their con-
servative views. However, we maintain that blindly sub-
scribing to this concept by prolonging the life of a brain-
dead woman just for the fetus’s sake would expose not
only the woman but also the fetus to unduly sufferance.
Indeed, extreme premature babies usually develop very
severe functional abnormalities and are therefore des-
tined to a life of sufferance; however, short it may be [7].
Given these premises, we fully support the decisions
made by both the American and the Irish judges as they
stemmed from the realization of a well-thought out bal-
ance struck between two lives: that which was conceived
and developing, and that which was already endowed
with biological and legal autonomy.
Regarding the D.P. case, instead, the judge’s decision
to continue the life support treatment seems to be sup-
ported by no plausible reason other than the highly cen-
surable one of carrying out some sort of atypical
experiment on the brain-dead pregnant woman. If on
one hand, such decision clearly defies the juridical obliga-
tion of the Superior Court to obtain a valid consensus on
the treatments to carry out on the young woman, on the
other hand, it also defies ethical and deontological
responsibilities—that is evaluating whether or not the
prolongation of somatic life support treatments would be
“proportionally” aligned with the desired outcomes or
vice versa.
In conclusion, if the free will of a brain-dead pregnant
woman, as expressed by the woman’s attorney, is to be
duly honored as a basic human right, so should the level
of protection given to human life, both throughout its
development and concretization. Thus, stemming from
these ethical principles is the need to strike a delicate
balance between the respective sides of the dispute,
which should always be considered in their “existential
uniqueness”.
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